

## Drought Emergency, Yes...Drought Disaster, No: Southern Africa 1991-93\*

AILSA HOLLOWAY

Coordinator, Disaster Mitigation for Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (DiMP),  
University of Cape Town

*The article analyses the rapid political change and redefinition of a regional identity in southern Africa in the 1990s in the context of the severe drought which affected these countries in 1991-92. As South Africa and its neighbours looked towards the normalisation of relations, concerted, regional, emergency actions prevented the drought conditions from producing a devastating drought disaster. These events not only served as a confidence-building measure demonstrating that southern Africa can coherently function as a region to avert crisis, but also provided the first opportunity for the former adversaries to successfully cooperate on (non-military) security matters. Nonetheless, although this case study illustrates that positive diplomatic initiatives can result from disaster relief efforts, the drought cannot be seen as the main driving force behind the normalisation of relations between South Africa and its neighbours.*

Across southern Africa, the early 1990s are recalled as a time of rapid political change. In Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and Lesotho, followed by South Africa in 1994, the old order began to step aside in favour of multiparty democracies. 1991 and 1992 respectively witnessed the temporary abatement of conflict in Angola and the cessation of hostilities in Mozambique.

1992 was also marked by the signing of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This accord, which was signed in August 1992 and which formalised a framework for future development cooperation, moved far beyond the vision of its predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC, established in 1980, had formerly provided a relatively unstructured forum for other southern African countries to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. SADCC's initial membership comprised the southern African states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. With Namibia's membership in 1990, SADC comprised ten southern African countries by 1991 (see Figure 1 further on).

DISASTER EMERGENCY, YES ...DROUGHT DISASTER, NO

The breathtaking pace with which these political developments unfolded between 1991-1994 has been carefully examined from political, economic, and security perspectives.<sup>1</sup> However, almost totally excluded from such analysis is mention of the 'worst drought in living memory'. This process, triggered by a powerful El Niño event in 1991,<sup>2</sup> precipitated an unprecedented acute food security crisis.<sup>3</sup> At its worst, the drought directly affected as many as twenty million SADC citizens in ten countries, as well as those in South Africa.<sup>4</sup> In response, it stimulated a concerted regional and international response that drew together eleven southern African countries in a complex multi-sectoral consolidated appeal and logistics effort that continued for more than a year. The scale of food imports alone represented the largest action of its kind since the Indian drought of 1966-67 and the aversion of famine in Europe in 1945-46.<sup>5</sup> Between April 1992 and June 1993, roughly five times the volume of food and other commodities were successfully shipped into southern Africa than were shipped to the Horn of Africa during the 1984-85 famine.<sup>6</sup> This extraordinary initiative, which prevented the type of 'famine' disaster so often associated with African crisis, was internationally acclaimed.

Yet, the 1992-93 drought response occurred in the aftermath of a decade of brutal civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, as well as widespread regional destabilisation by South Africa. The fact that life-saving cross-border cooperation occurred at all reflected steps already taken in the late 1980s to curtail armed conflict in the region. It also underlines the critical political contribution played by cross-border responses to external threats such as drought in an emerging region. In this example, concerted drought action served as an important 'confidence-building strategy', and provided a useful opportunity for former adversaries to cooperate to protect regional and national food security.

While these two southern African 'success stories', one political and the other humanitarian, occurred concurrently, past analysis has not reflected on their interplay. Nor have existing reviews examined the opportunities afforded as well as risks generated by such diplomatic-humanitarian interaction in a region seeking common purpose and identity.

This paper begins with an overview of regional political dynamics from the late 1980s to early 1990s. Central is the changing relationship between South Africa and the rest of southern Africa during these years. This decade was characterised by particularly brutal armed conflict, and widespread population displacement, along with the increasing political isolation of South Africa, both within the region and internationally. This overview of changes in southern Africa in the 1980s presents both the political opportunities and constraints that informed the subsequent drought response. An analysis follows of the 1991-92 drought, the regional and international dimensions of the institutional response it generated, and the relief processes that resulted. Emphasis is then given to the interaction between the region's changing political landscape and the opportunities afforded by such a far-reaching food security emergency. This article concludes by examining the 'paradox of disaster risk' as both an enabler of regional security and a regional threat in an emerging economic and development community.

### *1. Southern Africa in transition: 1980s-1992*

Just as an intense El Niño climate event of 1991 'triggered' a severe regional drought, southern Africa's rapidly changing political and military climate similarly 'triggered' enabling conditions for increased humanitarian cooperation between South Africa and its neighbours. The process of this political and military transition reflects a complex interaction between South Africa's internal policies, regional political dynamics, and international forces.

The 1980s were marked by escalating armed conflict in Mozambique and Angola, in which the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) respectively were at war with government forces (with the overt support of the South African military). These conflicts, along with the intensifying political isolation of South Africa, influenced the processes that dominated regional relations at the outset of the 1980s. These included South Africa's continuing defence of white minority rule, its neighbours' support for the African National Congress (ANC), and South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) insurgents operating against South Africa and Namibia, as well as South Africa's superior military power and its continuing pariah status in the region.

During the course of the decade, South Africa's preoccupation with preserving white minority rule was brutally played out internally and across the region through its 'total strategy against the total onslaught'.<sup>7</sup> This policy, justified as a defence against the spread of communism in southern Africa, was introduced in 1978 and provided the necessary explanation for counter-insurgency efforts against the ANC within South African borders. Moreover, it also provided a 'legitimate' argument for containing ANC and SWAPO operations through direct military support to the RENAMO and UNITA rebel movements in Mozambique and Angola respectively, as well as 'blitzkrieg' raids against ANC targets in Botswana, Maputo, and Maseru.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the military destabilisation it wrought across southern Africa, Pretoria also applied a wide range of economic and logistics pressures 'to keep its neighbours economically weak and remind them of their vulnerability'.<sup>9</sup> One central aspect of this process was South Africa's 'transport diplomacy' or 'transport weapon' which, during the 1980s, forced its SADCC neighbours to increasingly depend on South African rail infrastructure. South Africa's 'transport diplomacy' is attributed to J.G.H. Loubser, general manager of South African Transport Services, who acknowledged that transport 'was a highly strategic deterrent to political isolation and a key to relations with Africa in transport as well as other fields...I cannot but use these opportunities to the full to the benefit of South Africa in various areas and particularly in the political field'.<sup>10</sup>

During the 1980s, Pretoria applied its transport strategy in five ways across southern Africa. These included rental of locomotives and freight cars, as well as the imposition of special bond requirements on freight destined for its neighbours. During the 1980s at any given time, it was estimated that around 5,000 South African freight cars and fifty locomotives were on lease to neighbouring states.<sup>11</sup> A

DISASTER EMERGENCY, YES ... DROUGHT DISASTER, NO

third strategy involved 'luring away' freight from non-South African routes by offering concessional rates. This earned South Africa hard currency and 'deprived the alternative routes of funds for development'. By entrenching dependence on South African routes, this strategy gave increased credibility to the threat of cutting off the black states' lifelines. Other strategies involved South Africa's air services, specifically including the granting of subsidised freight rates on its airlines, and, of course, the sabotage and destruction of key transport routes through direct military intervention, or the indirect activities of RENAMO and UNITA.<sup>12</sup>

By the mid-1980s, almost every country in southern Africa was affected by this 'widening circle of warfare' and its resulting political, social, and economic destabilisation.<sup>13</sup> Between 1980 and 1989, an estimated 1.3 million people were killed directly or indirectly in Mozambique and Angola - more than the total number of soldiers lost by the United States in all its wars since 1776. In addition to open warfare between government and rebel forces, mass murder, war-related famine, and communicable diseases claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. It is estimated that more than 100,000 civilians perished in Mozambique during 1986-87 alone, while a further 100,000 died in the 1983-84 famine. The burden of this impact was disproportionately borne by children, with approximately 850,000 deaths attributed to warfare in these two countries.<sup>14</sup> Over eleven million Angolans and Mozambicans were forced from their homes at least once, with 1.5 million seeking safety in neighbouring states. By the end of 1988, Malawi was host to more than 600,000 Mozambican refugees while Zambia offered refuge to 200,000 Angolans during the course of the decade.

In addition, the accompanying destruction to infrastructure cost all SADCC countries heavily. In 1988, both Angola and Mozambique lost half their estimated Gross Domestic Products in the conflict. For other states, losses were less than 5% for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland; 10% for Tanzania; 20% for Zambia; 25% for Zimbabwe; and 40% for Malawi. The most significant proportion of the war burden derived from military expenditure. Without war and the pressing need to protect the Beira Corridor (see Figure 1 further on), Zimbabwe, for instance, would likely have generated recurrent and capital budget surpluses. Instead, the budget deficit was estimated at about 10% of GDP.<sup>15</sup>

By the late 1980s, the full economic and political repercussions of the 'total strategy' were also increasingly felt in South Africa itself. ANC efforts at forcing increasing international isolation on Pretoria were successfully reflected in both the imposition of financial sanctions in 1985 as well as mandatory trade and arms embargoes. These initiatives not only intensified South Africa's isolation from regional and international fora, but also significantly increased the cost of South Africa's 'offensive defence' efforts in Angola. By 1988, South Africa's stagnating economy had accumulated around US\$20 billion in foreign debt.<sup>16</sup> With the arrival of 50,000 Cuban troops to support Angolan government forces against UNITA rebels and the probability of significant casualties in the continuing Angolan conflict, South Africa responded to mounting United States diplomatic pressure for a negotiated rather than military solution. Ultimately, this was reflected in the Namibian-Angolan Peace Accords, which, signed in December 1988, introduced

dramatic shifts in regional security relations between South Africa and its SADCC neighbours.<sup>17</sup> First, they opened the door for Namibian independence in exchange for the closure of ANC military bases in Angola, as well as an end to SWAPO insurgency. Second, the positive dividends which followed from the accords and the peaceful passage of Namibian independence demonstrated internally that more could be gained from negotiation than costly attempts at economic or military hegemony.

The lessons of the transition years of the late 1980s and early 1990s were reflected in a 'new diplomacy' towards southern Africa. While still recognising the country's dominance as a regional power, this change in South African strategy acknowledged limits to that influence, relying more centrally on such 'non-coercive instruments of policy' as diplomacy, trade, and economic cooperation.<sup>18</sup> Following his accession to power in 1989, F.W. de Klerk extended this thinking further in his February 1990 watershed speech. In addition to announcing the unbanning of the ANC, Pan African Congress (PAC), and the South African Communist Party and Nelson Mandela's release, he elaborated South Africa's regional strategy: '[...] Hostile postures have to be replaced by cooperative ones; confrontation by contact; disengagement by engagement; slogans by deliberate debate. The season of violence is over; the time for reconstruction and reconciliation has begun'.<sup>19</sup>

### *Emergence of SADCC and SADC*

One consequence of the aggression wrought by South Africa was the solidarity it triggered, first across newly independent southern African states, and second, between these countries and both the ANC and SWAPO liberation movements.

The establishment of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 represented a major step towards regional alignment against South Africa. Jointly founded by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, it aimed at reducing economic dependence on South Africa, and coordinating investment and aid.<sup>20</sup> Recognising the considerable diversity of its members, including their dependence on South Africa, SADCC was intentionally established as a 'Conference' rather than an organisation, and was supported with a modest secretariat in Botswana, with its sectoral coordinating tasks allocated to member states. In the following decade, SADCC identified over 600 development projects with a total project cost of US\$6.3 billion, of which transport and communications accounted for US\$5.1 billion.<sup>21</sup> During this period, SADCC's first operational priority was to reduce its ever-increasing dependence on South African infrastructure, particularly for the region's six landlocked countries.

Following the establishment of the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) in Maputo, attention was placed on rehabilitating critical road and rail links. Of these, the rehabilitation of the Beira corridor was given first priority, so that by 1987, the corridor could handle up to two million tons of freight. The Beira Corridor was particularly important as it comprised a parallel system of rail, road, and oil pipeline links between the Mozambican port of Beira and Zimbabwe. As well as serving Mozambique and

Zimbabwe, the corridor could also be used by other landlocked states, specifically Malawi, Zambia, and even Botswana. In addition, rehabilitation efforts were also focused on both the Maputo and Dar es Salaam port systems.<sup>22</sup>

SADCC also set food security as the priority production sector for regional coordination - largely as cereal production repeatedly fell short of domestic requirements. In addition, in four of SADCC's Member States (Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Tanzania), over 80% of the population was dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Beyond meeting household and domestic food security needs, agriculture - particularly the export of maize - was an important generator of foreign exchange. During the 1980s, agriculture accounted for approximately 26% of the total regional export earnings. The persistent vulnerability of both the region's food production systems and its agriculture-export earning potential were underlined during the 1980s when only in 1989 did regional food production exceed southern Africa's population growth rate.<sup>23</sup>

SADCC had long accepted the definition of food security as 'access to an adequate amount of food at both national and household levels'.<sup>24</sup> This reflected the then internationally accepted definition of food security: 'Food security should have three specific aims, namely ensuring production of adequate food supplies, maximising stability in the flow of supplies, and securing access to available supplies on the part of those who need them'.<sup>25</sup> In the context of the prevailing regional food insecurity of the 1980s, SADCC gave strategic emphasis to this sector.

During the 1980s, two important regional institutions were established to support SADCC's food security initiatives: the Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) located in the Food Security Technical Advisory Unit in Harare and the Southern African Centre for Coordination in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) in Botswana. Based on crop information generated from national early warning systems in SADCC countries, REWU built capacity to monitor and consolidate data on regional food security for each growing season. SACCAR gave emphasis to research and training in seed production of sorghum, millet, cow peas, beans, and ground nut - crops considered essential in protecting household food security.

As a result of such initiatives, by 1990 SADCC was increasingly recognised as a functional regional grouping. Its members presented to their own peoples 'and to the world at large, a conception of their countries as a cohesive group, not merely an appendage of South Africa'.<sup>26</sup> Yet, SADCC had not been constituted as a legal entity with articles of association: member states simply signed a *Memorandum of Understanding*.<sup>27</sup> Following Namibia's independence, and especially after the unbanning of the liberation movements in South Africa and Mandela's release from prison in 1990, there was increasing urgency to formalise SADCC's structure and to extend its mandate. This reflected the awareness that with the impending end to white minority rule, South Africa could no longer be politically excluded from regional processes. In this context, it was clearly preferable to consolidate an already-established regional grouping, rather than to provide opportunity for South Africa to define an alternative regional power structure. Ironically, with progress towards multiparty elections in South Africa, and the likelihood of an ANC-led government, SADCC's original *raison d'être* was actually under threat.

Indeed, some have argued that SADCC continued to exist, 'thanks to the continued existence of the minority regime in South Africa. This bears the irony that the organisation owes a great deal of its cohesion to the continuation of white minority rule in the Republic and which, paradoxically, at the same time presents the major setback to SADCC's performance'.<sup>28</sup>

In anticipation of normalisation of relations with South Africa, The Southern African Development Community (SADC) declaration and treaty were signed in Windhoek in August 1992. The treaty obliged member states to a set of principles, including 'sovereign equality [...] solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; [and] peaceful settlement of disputes' and also outlined objectives which include economic integration and the promotion of peace and security.<sup>29</sup> These principles were further elaborated in the 1993 SADC Framework and Strategy for Building the Community. This agreement specifically emphasised the non-military dimensions of security, linked democratisation and development to security, and called for a reduction in military expenditure and force levels, along with the adoption of non-offensive defence doctrines.<sup>30</sup>

### *International dimension*

SADCC/SADC's evolution and the changing character of South Africa's engagement in the region during the 1980s clearly did not occur in an international vacuum. The early 1980s saw the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union played out in southern Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. The latter half of the decade saw the development of increasingly favourable relations between Mozambique and the United States, along with diminishing interest by Moscow in supporting military confrontation in both Angola and Mozambique. By 1987, implicit agreement had emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union that, while they both had interests in the region, these were not vital. Neither country could shape the region's future unilaterally. Furthermore, they agreed that regional conflicts should be resolved politically, not militarily, with both giving priority to seeing a more rapid, less violent negotiated transition to majority rule in South Africa.<sup>31</sup>

The decline in superpower military support for continued hostilities in Mozambique and Angola was matched by increasing international pressure on South Africa for internal reform. Towards the end of the decade, concerted efforts to end apartheid included political-diplomatic isolation as well as economic sanctions and military and socio-cultural exclusion. By the late 1980s, 'its isolation was so extensive [...] that South Africa was by far the most ostracised state in the world'.<sup>32</sup>

While the international community increasingly disinvested and disengaged from South Africa (except the United Kingdom), external support continued to flow into the SADCC states. The Scandinavian nations particularly provided substantial technical and financial assistance to SADCC's transport and communications sectors. Moreover, following Namibian independence and the 1991 election of Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, there was growing international optimism in the 'second wave of democratisation' across

the region.

This period also witnessed increasing regional involvement by international lending institutions, resulting in five of the ten SADCC countries introducing economic reform programmes supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAPs) adopted in Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe intended to correct and stabilise economies affected by plummeting commodity prices, as well as uncontrolled government over-expenditure, military spending, and crippling foreign debt. However, efforts to reduce government spending came at the price of rising food prices, declining public sector spending, and shrinking employment opportunities.<sup>33</sup>

### *II. The 1991-92 drought: its impact*

As the clouds of war were clearing over much of southern Africa, in the southeastern Pacific, another atmospheric-oceanic process was brewing. This powerful El Niño event, associated with below normal rainfall and drought in southern Africa, was first detected between July and September 1991. Drought was no stranger to southern Africa. Repeatedly during the twentieth century, individual southern African countries had experienced drought events, with a severe regional drought also recorded in 1913. From the mid-1960s, much of the region had been recurrently affected by rainfall failure, with severe drought conditions gripping much of southern Africa 1982-4. However, unlike other meteorological hazards, such as cyclones, hailstorms, or tornadoes, drought is considered a 'slow onset' threat. This has two implications. First, it impacts on agriculture or other economic activity and human well-being through deterioration of water supply and quality, sometimes over months or years. Second, the actual extent and intensity of these effects of rainfall variability are uncertain, and only become clearer as a drought process evolves.<sup>34</sup> This creates challenges in anticipating and averting the full range of human, environmental, economic, and other consequences. It is especially the case when a drought's full impact may not unfold for months or years after the meteorological warning and when this is further conditioned by a host of intervening social, economic, environmental, and political factors.

In southern Africa, the advance meteorological drought alert was confirmed in December 1991 by national reports of below normal rainfall from October to November. In response, REWU, together with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) further 'cautioned that the entire region was heading for almost total rain failure'. By the end of January 1992, these agencies, along with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), had accumulated 'convincing evidence that the region was indeed in the grip of a drought of unprecedented severity and extent'.<sup>35</sup>

By January 1992, with reports across the region of low precipitation and the likelihood of widespread crop failure, it was estimated that 2.6 million square miles of land were drought-stricken.<sup>36</sup> The drought's primary effect was on food production, dramatically increasing food import requirements, as well as undermining household food security for the majority of the region's rural

inhabitants. At a regional level, the most severe impacts were on the largest cereal producers, with South Africa, southern Africa's main grain exporter, producing less than 40% of its 'normal' crop. Moreover, Zimbabwe reported production at around a quarter of its annual average production recorded between 1986-7 and 1990-91.<sup>37</sup>

Table 1 compares cereal production and import requirements for southern Africa in both 'normal' years and in the 1991-92 drought. During 'normal production' years, the SADCC countries would expect to produce approximately 11.3 million tons of cereal to meet domestic consumption and export needs. This usually required an additional 1.6 million tons of imported food - or 12.7% of total requirements. In contrast, the widespread crop failure of 1991-92 generated a shortfall of over seven million tons, or 47.3% of total cereal needs. When the drought's impact on South Africa is also added, the import requirement is estimated at 12.5 million metric tonnes, or 50% of total needs.

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF CEREAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS DURING THE 1992-93 MARKETING YEAR AND NORMAL YEARS (1,000S OF TONS)<sup>38</sup>

Country	Normal Production	Estimated Prod. (% 'normal')	Normal Imports	Projected Shortfall
Angola	320	451 (141)	300	485
Botswana	67	20 (29.9)	151	225
Lesotho	189	79 (41.8)	207	295
Malawi	1,507	678 (45.0)	80	1,042
Mozambique	620	237 (38.2)	530	1,307
Namibia	114	33 (28.9)	61	144
Swaziland	144	42 (29.2)	47	142
Tanzania	4,100	3,253 (79.3)	85	538
Zambia	1,645	672 (40.9)	104	995
Zimbabwe	2,592	722 (27.9)	75	1,861
Total SADCC	11,298	6,187 (54.8%)	1,640 (12.7%)	7,034 (54.4%)
South Africa <sup>39</sup>	10,600	4,142 (39.1%)	---	5,500 (51.9%)
Total				
Southern Africa	21,898	10,329 (47.2%)	1,640 (6.6%)	12,534 (53.3%)

The clearest direct impact was the extreme precariousness of food security from household to national and regional levels. Of particular concern were landlocked Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, countries anticipating significant reductions in food production, ranging from 50-75%. Other priorities included Mozambique, given the continuing hostilities between RENAMO and government forces, and South Africa, whose unprecedented commercial import requirement exceeded five million tons. The logistics for such a huge import operation, which necessitated the movement of cereals in the opposite direction to the normal flows

out of Zimbabwe and South Africa, became the main focus of the international response.<sup>40</sup>

However, in addition to the direct impacts on food production, the drought triggered a host of economic, social, and health effects, reflecting the highly differentiated nature of southern Africa, socially and economically. All countries were faced with internal and external financing gaps to cover the cost of enormous cereal imports, as well as emergency interventions in the health and water sectors, and expenses generated by agricultural recovery.<sup>41</sup> From an economic perspective, Zambia and Zimbabwe were regarded as most affected. In Zimbabwe, the drought shock impacted an economy in the third year of economic structural reform. It undermined the government's ability to implement key economic reforms, including reduction of the budget deficit and rationalisation of the civil service, and in 1992-93, reduced GDP by 7.7%.<sup>42</sup> In the case of Zambia, the drought coincided with the re-introduction of economic reform and tight fiscal policies. With inflation exceeding 100%, and a balance of payments deficit of US\$1 billion, the prohibitive costs of food imports not only placed at risk Zambia's economic reform process<sup>43</sup> but also jeopardised the country's political stability following multiparty elections in 1991. Malawi, too, was severely affected, due to the interplay between the drought and deteriorating economic conditions, along with the presence of one million Mozambican refugees. Mozambique itself was SADCC's most vulnerable country, with over four million people internally displaced, huge import requirements, and a destroyed and disrupted transport infrastructure.

In South Africa, the massive decline in maize production was reflected in the loss of R365 million in export earnings and further impacts in other sectors linked to agriculture, estimated at R335 million. An estimated 49,000 agricultural and 20,000 formal sector jobs were lost.<sup>44</sup> At a more localised level, within the former Northern Transvaal area of South Africa, drought forced farmers to dismiss a third of their workers and return them to homelands. In the Venda homeland alone, almost all dry-land crops failed and 600,000 people were classified as having serious water problems. In Ganzankulu, another former homeland, nutritional diseases were reported to increase threefold 1991-92.<sup>45</sup>

While the regional crop failure was viewed as the drought's most significant impact, effects in other sectors were also recorded. Across the region, rural water sources ran dry, including bore holes and wells, along with small and large dams. The indirect consequences of widespread water supply failure included increasing rates of communicable disease, particularly cholera.

In 1992 alone, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported over 62,000 cases of cholera from SADCC countries, with 4,330 deaths.<sup>46</sup> Over 23,000 cases of cholera were reported for Mozambique, with Zambia recording nearly 7,000 cases. In addition, country-wide epidemics of meningococcal meningitis affected both Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>47</sup> Other indirect impacts of diminishing water supplies were reflected in marked reductions in available hydroelectricity. In Zimbabwe, significantly low water levels at the Kariba Dam resulted in massive electricity load shedding. This curtailment of electricity generated severe drought impacts in the manufacturing sector, and a loss of 3,000 jobs.<sup>48</sup>

At the household level, the drought was associated with widespread hardship and deprivation, particularly in poor, rural areas. These included substantial livestock losses and reduced incomes. In Zimbabwe, one million cattle were estimated to have died by December 1992.<sup>49</sup> Due to the precariousness of household food security, poor families reduced their food intake, including the number of meals. The drying-up of wells and bore holes obliged women and children - especially girls - to greatly increase the time and energy they were spending to fetch water. In some districts, it was reported that as many as six or eight hours were spent walking to the 'one well in the area which still had water, where they queued with people from other villages [...] In other villages, people dug shallow wells in dry riverbeds'.<sup>50</sup> In Zimbabwe, desperate families resorted to labour-intensive gold-panning to generate sufficient income to buy food.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, the drought's most significant impacts fell disproportionately on rural women, who traditionally take responsibility for household food security, water collection, and other health and nutrition priorities. In severely affected countries, like Zimbabwe and Malawi, as many as 50%-70% of the total population required emergency food relief.

Despite the far-reaching impact of the drought with respect to agricultural production, water supplies, health, and livestock, the spectre of famine typically associated with drought in Africa was not realised. In a comparable drought in West Darfur in Sudan in 1985, the resulting famine caused over 95,000 deaths, including one out of every twelve children,<sup>52</sup> yet the southern African drought of 1991-92 never became a 'disaster'.

### III. The 1991-92 drought: regional response

On 1-2 June 1992, a consolidated United Nations-SADCC Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) Appeal was launched at a specially convened donors' conference in Geneva. The UN appeal, the first jointly launched with a regional political grouping, initially sought US\$854 million to support food and non-food assistance to combat worsening drought conditions across the region. The appeal provided an essential platform for drawing international attention to the growing crisis in southern Africa. This was especially important given the higher profile accorded humanitarian emergencies unfolding in the Horn of Africa and Yugoslavia.<sup>53</sup>

The regional drought response is most widely acclaimed for its success in transporting over eleven million metric tonnes of food into and across land-locked countries, through long, overland routes as well as a network of export-oriented ports, roads, and railways (see Figure 1)<sup>54</sup> - a 'logistics effort of daunting proportion'.<sup>55</sup> The cost of food, transport, internal storage, and handling charges, along with non-food emergency measures, totalled US\$2.6 billion, equivalent to over 12% of the region's GDP. When South Africa's estimated US\$1.5 billion expenditures for its own imports is added, the total cost reached US\$4 billion.<sup>56</sup>

Although the joint UN-SADCC appeal was launched in June 1992, active measures had been underway for over six months. At the January 1992 SADCC Annual Coordination Conference convened in Maputo, SADCC's Food Security Unit was directed to assess the severity of impending drought conditions. Between

DISASTER EMERGENCY, YES ... DROUGHT DISASTER, NO

March and April, REWU's findings of the scale and extent of the food emergency were verified by a FAO/World Food Programme (WFP) assessment, and were presented at a meeting of SADCC Ministers of Agriculture and Transport in Lusaka on 16 April. This forum established a Regional Task Force, comprising senior officials from these two key ministries and called for six 'corridor' groups and the establishment of a Logistics Advisory Centre (LAC) in Harare.<sup>57</sup> By late 1991, South Africa was also anticipating a massive harvest failure and had already taken steps to plan for large-scale imports of as much as 5.5 million metric tonnes of food. In January 1992, South Africa took further measures to freeze maize exports outside the South African Customs Union (SACU).<sup>58</sup> In addition to developing a food import plan, the RSA Maize Board set up a 'Strategic Group' jointly with *Spoornet* and *Portnet* to coordinate the transport and logistics of the operation.<sup>59</sup> One of the Group's first initiatives was to establish a Grain Operations Control Centre (GOCC) in *Spoornet* Headquarters, Johannesburg. In late April 1992, the 'Strategic Group' was expanded to include senior representatives from the SADCC states likely to use the Southern Corridor (discussed further on), LAC, and WFP.<sup>60</sup>




FIGURE 1: SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES (1992) WITH TRANSPORT / SHIPMENT ROUTES FOR RELIEF FOOD (VALUES IN METRIC TONNES)

Rapidly deteriorating conditions anticipated with respect to food supply had also prompted Zimbabwe and Zambia to place commercial orders in excess of 700,000 metric tonnes. It is thought that these actions, taken by countries already under extreme economic duress, provided the most convincing evidence of the drought's severity to the international community.<sup>61</sup> The extreme gravity of southern Africa's food security was underlined when, by the end of March 1992, total SADC regional stocks totalled only 826,000 metric tonnes - only three weeks' supply.<sup>62</sup>

Between 1 April 1992 and 30 April 1993, 11.6 million metric tonnes of drought-related commodities were imported and transported across southern Africa.<sup>63</sup> In practical terms, this involved six transport corridors, nine ports, and eleven countries in an operation that extended from the Indian to the Atlantic Oceans. In SADC member states, the critical ports included Dar-es-Salaam (Northern Corridor), Beira and Maputo (Eastern Corridor), and Walvis Bay (Western Corridor). It also involved a Southern Corridor, comprising the four South African ports of Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. Of total imports, 5.9 million metric tonnes were destined for SADC countries, with 43% comprising commercial purchases and 57% donated commodities.<sup>64</sup> Altogether, over 3.1 million metric tonnes (53%) of all SADC imports cleared the first five ports, while South African ports handled a total of 8.6 million metric tonnes bound for both South African and SADC destinations.<sup>65</sup>

#### *IV. Factors underpinning the operation's success*

To support this regional effort, the joint UN-SADCC appeal generated approximately US\$708 million in food and non-food assistance, nearly 75% of the total US\$951 million sought.<sup>66</sup> This amount did not fully reflect all bilateral, non-governmental, and other contributions to the appeal. For instance, in the first half of 1992, the World Bank committed US\$345 million in quick-disbursing funds to Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In addition, the World Bank reprogrammed about US\$55 million out of ongoing projects to focus on the drought emergency in these countries, as well as Lesotho.<sup>67</sup>

Given the complexity of the regional operation, which continued for more than a year, there are several key factors that help explain its success. These include the critical role played by the *Regional Early Warning Unit*, the general 'seamlessness' of *information and transport flows*, *timely international support for food imports*, *South Africa's early mobilisation of food imports*, and the *resilience and resourcefulness* of rural southern Africans to protect the welfare of their families.

#### *Regional early warning unit (REWU)*

First, REWU was pivotal in the operation's success, due to its vigilance in alerting the region's governments of an impending food security crisis and its capacity to work cooperatively with a host of UN, bilateral, and non-governmental partners, as well as the private sector. During the course of the operation, REWU generated and disseminated an impressive amount of food security, supply, and shipment information. This was circulated via a monthly *Food Security Bulletin*,

*AgroMet Updates*, and, from LAC, both weekly *Shipping Bulletins* as well as a *Monthly Shipping Bulletin*.<sup>68</sup>

#### *'Seamlessness' of information and transport flows*

A second critical dimension was the operation's extraordinary 'seamlessness'. While this term is typically used to describe transport or logistics capacities, the southern African drought response was a unique example of a much wider institutional, logistical, and political 'seamlessness'. One of the hallmarks of the southern African drought operation was the *unprecedented level of communication* it generated across national borders, agencies, governments, and a diversity of private transport operators. This was characterised by an overwhelming flow of information and reports from perspectives as diverse as epidemic control, shipping, and agrometeorology. 'Information was shared in a spirit of cooperation, but there was also a degree of competition that led most agencies to strive for accuracy and credibility. The end result was accurate, comprehensive, and timely information available to all who could use it'.<sup>69</sup>

With respect to accessible information on the movement of cereals into and around the region, the SADC/WFP LAC played a critical role. Within a month of its establishment in Harare, LAC had developed standard reporting formats and procedures. Moreover, it had initiated contact with all ten SADCC countries, the six corridor groups, and most railways and main road transporters. With the aim of maintaining timely and accurate information on imported and pipeline shipments of all drought-related commodities, LAC also funded the installation of facsimile machines across the region.<sup>70</sup>

GOCC in Johannesburg also represented a 'unique concept in the transport sector in the region', in that it brought together representatives from *Portnet*, *Spoornet*, the RSA Maize and Wheat Boards, Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing Board, and the SADCC national railways of Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.<sup>71</sup> WFP contributed significantly by establishing a small Logistics Advisory Unit in Johannesburg that worked closely with GOCC and in placing shipping and rail experts in all major ports and at some internal transport interchanges to facilitate transport flows.<sup>72</sup>

In Geneva, a small DESA monitoring unit was established in the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).<sup>73</sup> From August 1992, comprehensive monthly situation reports were issued from DHA consolidating information on resource mobilisation, logistics gaps, food security, and changing regional needs. These reports consolidated regional information as well as developments within individual countries. This information was circulated widely to bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental organisations in southern Africa and internationally.

The free flow of information between SADC, bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental organisations was particularly facilitated by the concentration of southern African offices within Harare. Organisations with regional representation in Harare included FAO, WHO, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

(IFRC), while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative in Zimbabwe was designated the UN's Regional Coordinator. The combined effect of information accessibility across sectors and agencies, plus regular meetings, allowed a range of disparate constituencies throughout the region and beyond to be constantly updated on the status of donor contributions and food supply, as well as sector-specific priorities such as cholera control.

The 'seamlessness' of the transport/logistics effort was a major contributing factor to the rapid movement of cereals into and around the region. Road/rail freight movement was particularly impressive, with thirty-five of the fifty-eight different rail/road options delivering emergency food from port to destination in less than seven days.<sup>74</sup> In this context, one of the distinguishing features of the logistics operation was the role played by private transport operators. In other drought relief efforts in the Sahel, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Somalia, international agencies needed to import trucks, administrative personnel, and maintenance teams. In contrast, southern Africa's robust private transport sector was primarily responsible for bagging of grain, fumigation, freight forwarding, road haulage, and storage. Not only did this ensure rapid delivery of food, but it also meant that this critical sector received a major injection of funds in the absence of export-oriented grain movements.<sup>75</sup>

#### *International support for food imports*

Clearly, one of the enabling factors for such a successful operation was the generous international response to the UN-SADCC appeal. Pledges for emergency food assistance exceeded 80% of the estimated needs, allowing for relatively timely delivery of food to the region. However, given that overall less than 75% of the total US\$951 million for both food and non-food needs were met, there were serious resource constraints to the regional operation. For instance, the non-food sectors of emergency water supplies, health, and agricultural recovery were significantly under-resourced, with only US\$76 million or 44% pledged of the total US\$173 million sought for these activities.<sup>76</sup>

This bias in favour of food assistance was unsurprising, given that the regional institution driving the SADC response was the Food Security Technical Advisory Unit (FSTAU). Its food security mandate clearly limited FSTAU's capacity to advocate for the non-food drought-affected sectors. In addition, given that 'drought' and 'famine' are often stereotyped as synonymous, the international response was significantly biased in favour of food assistance - rather than measures that alleviated the health, agricultural, and livestock hardships associated with water scarcity. Last, the urgent need for food in southern Africa provided a large import market for maize and other commodities from Europe, North America, and South America.

#### *South African mobilisation of cereal imports*

An important factor to trigger international attention was the early intervention by South Africa to import large quantities of grain commercially. This had significant implications for the international cereals trade and meant that the

DISASTER EMERGENCY, YES ... DROUGHT DISASTER, NO

United States particularly was involved in the relief operation at an early stage.<sup>77</sup> In fact, the government of the United States was able to verify the anticipated severity of the drought through its Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) long before the June Appeal was launched. This allowed for mobilisation of US-financed food imports by April 1992, although full-scale donor response did not occur until after June.<sup>78</sup>

#### *Resilience and resourcefulness of rural southern Africans*

While considerable emphasis has been placed on the regional mobilisation of food aid, little attention was directed to the efforts of rural households to protect their families' well-being and their livelihoods. Although donor aid eventually made its way to villages in drought-stricken areas, vulnerable households in poor, rural communities experienced considerable hardship. Although the international response focused on food, the worst hardships were triggered by acute water scarcity. The physical toll of walking for hours to a functioning water point, and then queuing patiently for a container of water, was borne primarily by rural women and children in dry and dusty villages, often in isolated and inaccessible areas.

#### *V. The drought operation as a diplomatic opportunity*

International perceptions of drought in Africa have been historically shaped by images of emaciated children and congested feeding centres staffed with expatriate health workers, along with allegations against governments for using 'food as a weapon'. The southern African drought response challenged these external perceptions, and also provided an extraordinary confidence-building opportunity for southern Africa as a region.

#### *Opportunities for SADC*

SADCC/SADC's coordination of Africa's largest food logistics effort presented its Member States with a concrete example of functional cooperation at a time when SADCC's original mission was in urgent need of redefinition. In this context, the drought effort was significant in confirming SADC's stature as a viable regional entity not only to the outside community, but also among its Member States. The operation extended beyond SADCC's original expression of political solidarity against South Africa into functional cooperation across borders and agencies, and between the private and public sectors. It reconfirmed the 1980s foresight of extensive capital investment and refurbishment of the region's critical ports, rails, and roads as vital arteries for the land-locked countries<sup>79</sup> and underlined the critical importance to southern Africa's food security of REWU, also established in the 1980s. Concerted drought action thus served as an important 'confidence-building strategy,' and provided a useful opportunity for former adversaries to cooperate jointly to protect regional and national food security. Moreover, it provided a framework for functional cooperation across the entire region, including South Africa, in part helping to visualise SADC's Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, elaborated in 1993.



However, SADC's constructive engagement of South Africa as an operational partner did not extend to South Africa's political inclusion at a ministerial level. Moreover, by involving its powerful neighbour in a cooperative venture driven primarily from Harare, the regional body signalled unequivocally to the world and to South Africa that SADC - and not Pretoria - was driving the regional effort. In this regard, the operation reconfirmed that southern Africa's political centre rested north of the Limpopo - even as South Africa made positive steps towards democratic governance, and even despite South African ports handling the bulk (74%) of all incoming food commodities.

### *Opportunities for South Africa*

For South Africa, the drought operation provided an excellent platform for re-engaging with the rest of southern Africa. In many ways, the enormous inflow of grain supplied an exemplary opportunity for South Africa to apply its 'transport diplomacy' constructively, instead of destructively. The country's willingness to provide port access for SADC imports, as well as expedited road/rail transport - despite its own massive import requirements - contributed substantially to the success of the food operation.

Despite its significant operational role, South Africa's participation was explicitly and repeatedly underplayed at the regional level and within an international context. With UN sanctions still in place, and with democratic elections yet to be finalised, South Africa's contribution to the regional effort was consistently excluded from UN and other international operations updates. This resulted in further regional and international political leverage for continued internal progress towards full democracy. With respect to South Africa's ongoing internal reform process, the drought operation provided a practical opportunity for representatives of South Africa's opposing political parties to participate in SADC's technical drought discussions. Effectively, this allowed engagement between the ruling National Party and the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) at a non-ministerial level.<sup>80</sup>

### *Opportunities for the international community*

The drought operation's success achieved many of the international community's political and economic objectives. Decades of support to dismantle apartheid in South Africa, along with Namibia's independence and multiparty democracy in Zambia, justified generous international support during this period. The human and economic costs of a drought disaster threatened to derail economic reform processes in countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. Given the sizeable bilateral and multilateral investments made to support economic structural adjustment of the 1980s and early 1990s, the political and economic risks to national and regional stability associated with non-involvement far outweighed the costs of generous international support.

### *VI. 'Drought diplomacy'?*

The political dividends in the relationship between SADC and South Africa that followed this joint effort were facilitated by several key factors. First, SADC was a credible, unified political grouping that had existed for more than a decade and that had the coordinating capacity to support the response of its Member States. Its political and international stature was significantly enhanced when it became the first regional political grouping to jointly launch a humanitarian appeal with the UN. In the context of relations with South Africa, SADC's enhanced international stature effectively counter-balanced South Africa's economic and transport supremacy in the operation.

Second, the political climate between South Africa and its SADC neighbours had changed and was no longer characterised by the military confrontation and destabilisation that had featured during the 1980s. Although sufficiently wary of South Africa's past transport domination to locate LAC in Harare, the end of hostilities between South Africa and its neighbours provided a platform for SADC to cooperate practically with South Africa in the drought effort. Unlike other types of disaster relief programmes, drought assistance in this example continued for longer than a year, providing opportunities for frequent and regular contact at a technical level between players on both sides of the Limpopo. In many cases, the functional relationships established during the operation continued after the relief effort had concluded. For instance, the participating groups in the Johannesburg-based GOCC agreed to continue operating GOCC beyond the relief effort.<sup>81</sup>

A third key dimension was the availability of reasonable port/road/rail infrastructure along with an energetic private transport sector in all countries. This ensured that in no time during the course of the operation was any southern African state's management of its individual relief operation infringed upon by a neighbouring state or international organisation. Similarly, at a regional level, there was little need to supplant existing institutions with parallel response structures staffed by expatriate relief or military personnel.

Last, and probably overlooked, was the nature of the threat itself. Drought is a slow-onset threat, unlike cyclones, thunderstorms, and other meteorological phenomena. Technically, it affords a relatively long lead-time between the alert and its food/water security consequences. If responded to timeously, as in the southern African drought, its impact can be reduced by accelerated emergency measures carried out through existing institutions before famine occurs. Advanced famine or sudden-onset threats with devastating impacts, such as the floods in Mozambique in February 2000, do not afford such generous lead-time. The advance drought warning allowed for the relatively timely movement of food commodities throughout the region, using road/rail and private sector transport. It did not warrant involvement of the region's armed forces in any significant extent, as compared to the dramatic but necessary rescue efforts of the South African National Defence Force in Mozambique in the aftermath of Cyclone Eline that struck in February 2000. One might speculate that had the 1991-92 El Niño been a La Niña event, triggering widespread rainfall and flooding in southern Africa,<sup>82</sup>

whether the SADCC countries would have willingly invited South Africa's armed forces to carry out a large-scale search and rescue operation for such a flood disaster. Therefore, not all natural hazards present the same configuration of diplomatic opportunities or constraints. This is particularly important when relief operations are implemented with military materiel and personnel perceived as hostile to recipient communities.

Similarly, the cessation of hostilities between South Africa and its SADCC neighbours provided an opportunity for mutual cooperation that clearly did not prevail during the 1982-84 drought. In Mozambique, engulfed in a brutal civil war during that period, it is estimated that the combined effect of severe drought and armed conflict cost the lives of over 100,000 people.<sup>83</sup> While diplomatic dividends can indeed flow from disaster relief efforts, in this instance, joint cooperation was only possible once potential military, economic, and other forms of regional confrontation had been controlled.

### VII. Southern African drought: food security risk or regional security opportunity?

The 1992-93 drought operation provided a political 'win-win' formula at regional and international levels. It reconfirmed SADC's stature to its Member States, the international community, and especially to South Africa. It also provided an opportunity for operational regional cooperation that engaged South Africa technically, but not politically. For South Africa, it offered a timely platform to use its 'transport diplomacy' to maximum benefit, to reverse its political isolation, and to improve relations with its SADC neighbours. Internationally, the successful drought operation protected the region's emerging democracies, as well as substantial international investments in economic structural adjustment programmes. In addition, it provided continued leverage for internal reform in South Africa. In this context, the southern African drought emergency provided a useful opportunity to build *operational confidence* between SADC's Member States and South Africa, as a prelude to South Africa's inevitable admission to SADC after a democratically elected government took leadership.

Nearly a decade later, with the demise of apartheid and South Africa's entry into SADC as well as re-entry into the global economy, regional relations have clearly shifted. No longer are security concerns focused primarily on 'regional defence' against an external aggressor. Rather, there is increasing focus on strengthening 'regional security' against a host of internal threats.<sup>84</sup>

Drought plays a paradoxical role. On one hand, it places the entire region at enormous food security risk. This has the potential to undermine economic development at the macroeconomic level, as well as to create enormous hardship and deprivation, especially in marginal rural communities. Moreover, if poorly managed, drought, along with its accompanying severe food and water shortages, has the potential to generate massive rural-urban and cross-border migration, as well as social unrest and instability. On the other, as a shared non-military threat to the region's internal security, drought also has considerable diplomatic value as a 'confidence-building' opportunity, by allowing regional engagement and

cooperation. Concerted efforts to prevent costly drought 'disasters' fall into the same category as other measures that build regional confidence, such as 'trade, investment, labour, technology and crime detection'.<sup>85</sup>

The 1992-93 drought operation simultaneously demonstrated this paradox - southern Africa's *agricultural vulnerability* to rainfall variability with the diplomatic opportunity this generated to reduce the region's *political vulnerability*. This complex relationship between political and natural processes goes even further, as illustrated in the 1992-93 drought response. It demonstrated that, while diplomatic dividends can indeed flow from disaster relief efforts, in this instance, joint cooperation was only possible once potential military, economic, and other forms of regional confrontation that dominated the 1980s had been controlled.

Given the likelihood of increasing incidence of extreme weather conditions in southern Africa, drought and other weather-related hazards are expected to occur more frequently. The management of disaster risk increasingly yields not only a humanitarian imperative, but also, more importantly, a strategic component of regional security, economic cooperation, and sustainable development.

\* The author gratefully acknowledges Coleen Vogel, University of the Witwatersrand and Reggie Mugwara, SADC Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Development Unit for reviewing this article, and Sylvia Prime for her assistance in completing the manuscript.

- <sup>1</sup> See G. Chipeta and R. Davies, *Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macroframework Study Report*, Gaborone, SADC, 1993; I. Mandaza and A. Tostenson, *Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future*, Gaborone, SADC, 1994; and B. Tsie, 'States & Markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Beyond the Neo-liberal Paradigm', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1996, pp. 75-98.
- <sup>2</sup> For an explanation of El Niño, see M. H. Glantz, 'Climate-Related Disaster Diplomacy: A US-Cuban Case Study', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. XIV, no. 1, Autumn-Winter 2000.
- <sup>3</sup> According to the World Food Summit in 1996, food security exists when 'all peoples at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life'.
- <sup>4</sup> Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA): Consolidated UN-SADC Appeal Midterm Review*, Geneva, United Nations, 1992, p. 5.
- <sup>5</sup> E. Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response to the 1991-1992 Southern African Drought*, London, Overseas Development Administration, 1995, EV568, vol. I, p. 13.
- <sup>6</sup> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), *World Disasters Report 1994*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 100.
- <sup>7</sup> R.S. Jaster, 'War and Diplomacy', in R.S. Jaster *et al*, *Changing Fortunes: War, Diplomacy, and Economics in Southern Africa*, United States, Ford Foundation and the Foreign Policy Association, 1992, p. 24.
- <sup>8</sup> Jaster, 'War and Diplomacy', p. 27.
- <sup>9</sup> M. Mbeki and M. Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry and Interdependence in Southern Africa', in Jaster *et al*, *Changing Fortunes*, p. 91.

- 10 Mbeki and Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry', p. 94.
- 11 Mbeki and Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry', p. 95.
- 12 Mbeki and Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry', pp. 96-97.
- 13 Jaster, 'War and Diplomacy', p. 20.
- 14 The statistics here and in the rest of this paragraph are from United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 'The Flowers Are Cut Down: The Human Costs of Regional Conflict', in Jaster *et al*, *Changing Fortunes*, pp. 131-137.
- 15 UNICEF, 'The Flowers Are Cut Down', pp. 136-137.
- 16 Jaster, 'War and Diplomacy', p. 41.
- 17 Jaster, 'War and Diplomacy', pp. 58-59.
- 18 A. du Pisani, 'South Africa and the Region', in G. Mills, ed., *From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations 1990-1994*, Johannesburg, South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 1994, p. 59.
- 19 du Pisani, 'South Africa and the Region', p. 60.
- 20 G. Cawthra, *Sub-Regional Security Cooperation: The Southern African Development Community in Comparative Perspective*, Cape Town, Centre for Southern African Studies, School of Government, University of Western Cape, 1997, p. 5.
- 21 Mbeki and Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry', p. 77.
- 22 Mbeki and Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry', p. 99.
- 23 C. Thompson, *Drought Management Strategies in Southern Africa: From Relief Through Rehabilitation to Vulnerability Reduction*, 1993, p. 12.
- 24 Thompson, *Drought Management Strategies*, p. 10.
- 25 Council of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), *Report of Eighth Session of the Committee on World Food Security*, CL83/10, Rome, April 1983, p. 6.
- 26 Mbeki and Nkosi, 'Economic Rivalry', p. 106.
- 27 Cawthra, *Sub-Regional Security Cooperation*, pp. 6-7.
- 28 G. Mills, 'Searching for the Eye of the Needle: South Africa and Southern African Security', in Mills, *From Pariah to Participant*, p. 76.
- 29 Cawthra, *Sub-Regional Security Cooperation*, p. 6.
- 30 Cawthra, *Sub-Regional Security Cooperation*, p. 7.
- 31 M. Clough, 'The Superpowers in Southern Africa: From Confrontation to Cooperation', in Jaster *et al*, *Changing Fortunes*, pp. 122-123.
- 32 D. Geldenhuys, 'International Involvement in South Africa's Political Transformation', in W. Carlsnaes, and M. Muller, eds., *Change and South African External Relations*, Johannesburg, International Thomson Publishing Inc., 1997, p. 38.
- 33 IFRC, *World Disasters Report 1994*, p. 103.
- 34 Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. I, p. 15.
- 35 Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Assessment of the Response to the 1991/92 Drought in the SADC Region*, Harare, Food Security Technical Advisory Unit, 1993, p. 6.
- 36 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 3.
- 37 Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. I, p. 15.
- 38 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 6.
- 39 IFRC Southern Africa Regional Office, *Regional Disaster Management Workshop: Part II Country and Background Papers*, Harare, 1993.
- 40 Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. I, p. 17.

- 41 Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. II, p. 40.
- 42 Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. II, p. 40.
- 43 DHA and SADC, *Drought Emergency in Southern Africa*, p. 48.
- 44 C. Benson and E. Clay, *The Impact of Drought on Sub-Saharan African Economics: A Preliminary Examination*, London, Overseas Development Institute, 1994, Working Paper 77, p. 32.
- 45 Mills, 'Searching for the Eye of the Needle', p. 73.
- 46 Thompson, *Drought Management Strategies*, p. 135.
- 47 Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), *Statement of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs*, paper presented at SADC Regional Drought Management Workshop, Harare, 13-16 September 1993.
- 48 Benson and Clay, *The Impact of Drought*, p. 37.
- 49 DHA and SADC, *Drought Emergency in Southern Africa*, p. 7.
- 50 C. Eldridge, *A Provisional framework for Preparing for Drought in Southern Africa*, unpublished report, Johannesburg, Save the Children Fund, 1997, p. 10.
- 51 D. Hicks, *An Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Drought Relief Programme 1992-93: The Roles of Household Level Response and Decentralised Decision Making*, Harare, World Food Programme, 1993.
- 52 Eldridge, *A Provisional framework for preparing for Drought*, p. (i).
- 53 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 11.
- 54 Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), *Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA): Consolidated UN-SADCC Appeal*, DHA and SADCC, 1992, pp. 8-9.
- 55 IFRC, *World Disasters Report 1994*, p. 101.
- 56 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, pp. 4-5.
- 57 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 10.
- 58 Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. I, pp. 20-21.
- 59 In 1990, the Government of South Africa created *Transnet* to commercialise its transport business interests and to deregulate South Africa's transport sector. *Spoornet*, a division of *Transnet*, operates in the Freight Logistics and Passenger markets in southern Africa and is the largest haulier and transporter of general freight in the southern African region. *Portnet*, another division of *Transnet*, manages and controls all seven commercial ports on the South African coastline - Durban, Richard's Bay, East London, Port Elizabeth, Mossel Bay, Cape Town, and Saldanha Bay.
- 60 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 64.
- 61 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 9.
- 62 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 7.
- 63 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 23.
- 64 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 70.
- 65 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 23.
- 66 DHA, *Statement of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs*.
- 67 S. Brushett, *A World Bank Perspective on Drought Management*, paper presented at SADC Regional Drought Management Workshop, Harare, 13-16 September 1993, p. 1.
- 68 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 15.
- 69 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 14.
- 70 SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 14.

- <sup>71</sup> ADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 64.
- <sup>72</sup> SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 14.
- <sup>73</sup> DHA and SADC, *Drought Emergency in Southern Africa*, p. 5.
- <sup>74</sup> SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, pp. 80-82.
- <sup>75</sup> SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>76</sup> DHA, *Statement of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs*.
- <sup>77</sup> Clay *et al*, *Evaluation of ODA's Response*, vol. 1, p. 22.
- <sup>78</sup> SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 9.
- <sup>79</sup> Thompson, *Drought Management Strategies*, p. 130.
- <sup>80</sup> R. Mugwara, personal communication, 2000.
- <sup>81</sup> SADC, *Assessment of the Response*, p. 64.
- <sup>82</sup> For an explanation of La Niña, see M.H. Glantz, 'Climate-Related Disaster Diplomacy: A US-Cuban Case Study', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. XIV, no. 1, Autumn-Winter 2000.
- <sup>83</sup> Jaster, 'War and Diplomacy', p. 20.
- <sup>84</sup> Mills, 'Searching for the Eye of the Needle', pp. 71-74.
- <sup>85</sup> Mills, 'Searching for the Eye of the Needle', pp. 79-85.